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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is interest in reforming bank regulation such 
that capital requirements are more closely linked to a bank’s contribution to the overall 
risk of the financial system. In our paper we compare alternative mechanisms for 
allocating the overall risk of a banking system to its member banks. Overall risk is 
estimated using a model that explicitly incorporates contagion externalities present in the 
financial system. We have access to a unique data set of the Canadian banking system, 
which includes individual banks’ risk exposures as well as detailed information on 
interbank linkages including OTC derivatives. We find that systemic capital allocations 
can differ by as much as 50% from 2008Q2 capital levels and are not related in a simple 
way to bank size or individual bank default probability. Systemic capital allocation 
mechanisms reduce default probabilities of individual banks as well as the probability of 
a systemic crisis by about 25%. Our results suggest that financial stability can be 
enhanced substantially by implementing a systemic perspective on bank regulation. 
JEL classification: G21, C15, C81, E44 
Bank classification: Financial stability 
Résumé 
Au lendemain de la crise financière, l’idée de réformer la réglementation bancaire de telle 
sorte que les exigences de fonds propres soient plus étroitement rattachées à la 
contribution de chaque banque au risque global du système financier suscite de l’intérêt. 
Les auteurs comparent divers mécanismes de répartition du risque global d’un système 
bancaire parmi les banques membres. Le risque global est estimé à l’aide d’un modèle 
qui intègre explicitement les externalités de contagion présentes dans le système 
financier. L’ensemble de données unique sur le système bancaire canadien auquel les 
auteurs ont accès renseigne sur les expositions des banques individuelles au risque et 
contient des informations détaillées sur les liens interbancaires, y compris ceux qui se 
rapportent aux produits dérivés de gré à gré. Les auteurs constatent que les résultats de la 
répartition systémique des fonds propres peuvent différer de jusqu’à 50 % des niveaux de 
fonds propres observés au deuxième trimestre de 2008 et que leur relation avec la taille 
ou la probabilité de défaut de chaque banque n’est pas simple. Les mécanismes de 
répartition systémique des fonds propres permettent de réduire d’environ 25  % les 
probabilités de défaut des banques individuelles ainsi que la probabilité d’une crise 
systémique. Les résultats des auteurs indiquent que l’application d’une approche 
systémique en matière de réglementation bancaire peut accroître substantiellement la 
stabilité financière. 
Classification JEL : G21, C15, C81, E44 
Classification de la Banque : Stabilité financière 1 Introduction
Under our plan ... ﬁnancial ﬁrms will be required to follow the example of millions
of families across the country that are saving more money as a precaution against
bad times. They will be required to keep more capital and liquid assets on hand
and, importantly, the biggest, most interconnected ﬁrms will be required to keep
even bigger cushions. (Geithner (2009))
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has demonstrated the adverse effects of a large scale breakdown
of ﬁnancial intermediation for the rest of the economy. While academics, international institu-
tions, and central bankers have argued for some time that bank regulation should be designed
from a systemic perspective (Borio (2002), Gauthier and St-Amant (2005)), bank regulation is
currently aimed at the level of the individual bank, without taking any externalities inherent to
the ﬁnancial system into account. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, there is a growing
consensus to bring a macroprudential perspective into bank regulation. One proposal is to re-
quire ﬁnancial institutions to internalize the externalities they impose on the system by adjusting
capital requirements so that they better reﬂect an individual bank’s contribution to the overall
risk of the ﬁnancial system. We refer to these adjusted capital requirements as systemic capital
requirements.
In this paper, we compare ﬁve approaches to assigning systemic capital requirements to in-
dividual banks based on each bank’s contribution to systemic risk:component and incremental
value-at-risk from the risk management literature (Jorion (2007)), two allocation strategies us-
ing Shapley values,1 and the CoVaR measure introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009).
Computing systemic capital requirements, however, is more complex than computing risk con-
tributions. Setting required capital equal to risk contributions based on current observed capital
levels is insufﬁcient because total risk in the banking system will change once new capital re-
quirements are implemented. We therefore have to follow an iterative procedure to solve for a
ﬁxed point for which capital allocations to each bank are consistent with the contributions of
each bank to the total risk of the banking system. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to do so.
Before the allocation process can begin, we measure systemic risk using a model of banking
losses under a macro stress scenario. We build upon the models developed by central banks
1Shapley values are commonly used in the literature on risk allocation. Denault (2001) reviews some of the
risk allocation mechanisms used in this paper, including the Shapley value. See also Kalkbrener (2005).
2which include spillover and contagion effects through network and asset ﬁre sale externalities
(e.g. Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009)).
We do not allow for any endogenous reactions by the government or central bank, since these
would reduce the impact of the externalities we precisely want to measure.
We generate a macro stress scenario which causes varying increases in probabilities of
defaults (PD) for different economic sectors affecting all banks’ loan portfolios. Following
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a), we simulate loan losses for each bank using a portfolio
credit risk model. Using a variant of Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) that differentiates
banks according to the riskiness of their assets, banks that fall short of regulatory capital re-
quirements start selling assets to a market with inelastic demand and the resulting drop in prices
forces other banks to sell assets as well. Banks that default either because of loan losses or de-
creasingassetvaluationsarenotabletofullyhonortheirinterbankpromises, potentiallycausing
the contagious default of other banks. These spillover effects make the correlation of banks’
asset values dependent of the health of the overall ﬁnancial system. Clearing in the interbank
market is captured using a Eisenberg and Noe (2001) network model. We use a unique data
set of the six largest Canadian banks as a representation of the whole Canadian banking system
since they hold 90.3% of all banking assets. Our sample contains detailed information on the
composition of the loan book, including the largest loan exposures of individual banks. As in
previous studies (see Upper (2007) for a summary), our data covers exposures between banks
arising from traditional lending. We expand this set of exposures by also covering those arising
from another on-balance sheet item, cross-shareholdings, and from off-balance sheet instru-
ments such as exposures related to exchange traded and OTC derivatives. While derivatives are
often blamed for creating systemic risk, the lack of data in many countries (including the U.S.)
makes it hard to verify. Our expanded dataset enables us to better capture linkages among banks
and contagious bank defaults.
With the same amount of overall capital in the banking system, we ﬁnd that systemic capital
requirementscanreducedefaultriskoftheindividualbankaswellastheriskofasystemiccrisis
by about 25%. Systemic capital allocations differ from current observed capital levels by up to
50% for individual banks, and the reallocation of capital that the macroprudential rules suggest
are not related in a simple way to bank size, bank PD, or risk weighted assets. We also ﬁnd
that ignoring our information on derivatives and cross shareholdings gives us a very different
picture of individual bank risk with potential important effects on systemic risk. This speaks to
the importance of getting better information about exposures between ﬁnancial institutions.
3In the literature we ﬁnd two main approaches to measure and allocate systemic risk. One
stream uses stock market data to get information on banks’ correlation structure and potential
spillovers. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) propose the CoVaR measure, which they compute
for a panel of ﬁnancial institutions and regress on bank characteristics. This literature is related
to existing studies of contagion in ﬁnancial markets (see among others Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003)). Another stream of research builds on a network model
in conjunction with an interbank clearing algorithm introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a) and Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Mar-
tin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009) use a dataset of interbank linkages for the Austrian and
British banking system, respectively, and compute measures of systemic risk and systemic im-
portance for individual banks. Upper (2007) reviews that literature.
These two approaches can be interpreted in light of economic theories of ﬁnancial ampliﬁ-
cation mechanisms at work during crisis. For example, Allen and Gale (1994) seminal paper
shows how asset prices can be optimally determined by cash-in-the-market in crisis periods.
Allen and Gale (2000) propose a model of contagion through a network of interbank exposures.
Shin (2008) develops a theory of liquidity spillover across a network of ﬁnancial institutions re-
sulting from expansions and contractions of balance sheets over the credit cycle. Krishnamurthy
(2009) reviews the literature on the mechanisms involving balance-sheet and asset prices, and
those involving investors’ Knightian uncertainty. Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) con-
duct a simulation study of a stylized banking system and ﬁnd that the systemic importance of an
institution increases in its size as well as its exposure to common risk factors. They use Shapley
values to allocate risk measured by value-at-risk as well as expected loss.
We extend previous research in two ways: ﬁrst we highlight that changing capital require-
ments change the risk and correlation structure in the banking system and that systemic capital
requirements have to be seen as a ﬁxed point problem. Second we provide empirical evidence
that systemic capital requirements can reduce individual as well as systemic risk using actual
data for a whole banking system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the approaches to assign systemic
capitalrequirements, themodelforassessingsystemicriskisdescribedinSection3, andSection
4 details credit loss scenario generation and the data. We present the results in Section 5 and
give a conclusion in Section 6.
42 Systemic capital requirements
Setting systemic capital requirements raises two fundamental questions. First, what is the total
level of capital required in the banking system, which determines the overall magnitude of the
shock that a banking system can withstand? Second, how to break down the overall risk of
the banking system and set capital requirements equal to each banks’ contribution to systemic
risk? The ﬁrst question is a policy decision balancing efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation with
overall stability of the system which we do not address in this paper. We focus on the second
question by comparing alternative mechanisms to reallocate capital among banks, for a given
level of total capital in the system.
Systemic capital requirements differ from risk contribution analysis as it is used in portfolio
or risk management. In a risk management or portfolio management setting we want to compute
risk contributions for a given portfolio with an exogenous level of overall risk. Using the same
approach to computee systemic capital requirements in a banking system would be incorrect
because both the overall risk and each bank’s contribution depend on the capital allocation.
As banks hold more capital they are less likely to default through direct losses and contagion.
Reallocating bank capital changes the overall risk of the banking system, particularly in the
presence of contagion.2
Estimating systemic capital requirements is therefore a ﬁxed point problem. We have to
reallocate bank capital such that the risk contribution of each of the n banks to total risk equals
the allocated capital. Assume that there is a model, like the one in this paper, that estimates a
banking systems’ joint risk distribution (C) for a given vector of bank capital endowments
C = (C1;:::;Cn). A risk sharing rule f() then allocates the overall risk (C) to individual




Because of the high degree of non-linearity, the ﬁxed point in equation (1) can only be found
2Changing bank capital requirements might also change individual bank risk because of a long-term incentive
to change banks asset portfolios. We do not consider this channel in our analysis for several reasons: systemic
capital requirements can be continuously adjusted as banks’ long term asset portfolios change. We also believe
that the direct effect that changes in capital have on bank solvency risk outweigh the indirect incentive effects on
banks’ optimal asset choice.
5numerically.3 From the discussion above it also becomes clear that we cannot ﬁnd systemic
capital requirements without a model (C) of the banking system’s risk. Our model, which we
describe in detail in Section 3, is simulation based. For each of our m simulated scenarios we
record the proﬁt or loss for each bank to get the joint loss distribution for all banks, i.e. we get
an n  m matrix of losses, which we call L. We then allocate the risk of the whole system to
each individual bank using different risk allocation methodologies f(:).
We now look at several risk sharing methodologies proposed in the literature and compare
bank PDs and measures of systemic stability under their respective ﬁxed point capital alloca-
tions.
2.1 Component value-at-risk (beta)
Following Jorion (2007) we compute the contribution of each bank to overall risk as the beta of
the losses of each bank with respect to the losses of a portfolio of all banks. Let li;s be the loss of
bank i in scenario s and lp;s =
P
i li;s, then i =
cov(li;lp)
2(lp) . Furthermore let Ci be the preexisting
tier 1 capital of bank i. We reallocate the total capital in the banking system according to the









i is the reallocated capital of bank i. A nice property of this rule is that the sum of
the betas equals one, so a redistribution of total capital amongst the banks is straightforward.
2.2 Incremental value-at-risk
We ﬁrst compute the value-at-risk (VaR) of the joint loss distribution of the whole banking
system, which we get by adding the individual losses across banks in each simulated scenario.
We chose a conﬁdence level of 99.5% and run 1,000,000 scenarios. The portfolio VaR, VaRp,
is therefore the 5,000th largest loss of the aggregate losses lp. Next we compute the VaR of
the joint distribution of all banks except bank i, VaR i, as the 5,000th largest value of the
3We ﬁnd that it takes on average 20 iterations until the norm of the changes in capital requirements from one




j=1;j6=i lj;s. The incremental VaR for bank i,iVaRi, is then deﬁned as
iVaRi = VaRp   VaR
 i: (3)
The incremental VaR therefore can be interpreted as the increase in risk that is generated by
adding bank i to the system.4
While component VaR computes the marginal impact of an increase in a bank’s size, in-
cremental VaR captures the full difference in risk that one bank will bring to the system. The
disadvantage of the second risk decomposition is that the sum of the incremental VaRs does not
add up to the VaR of the banking system. In our analysis, however, we found that difference to










In a recent paper, Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) propose to use Shapley values to allo-
cate capital requirements to individual banks. Shapley values can be seen as efﬁcient outcomes
of multi player allocation problems in which each player holds resources that can be combined
with others to create value. The Shapley value then allocates a fair amount to each player based
on the average marginal value that the player’s resource contributes to the total.5 In this context,
one can argue that a certain level of capital has to be provided by all banks as a buffer for the
banking system and that Shapley values help to determine how much capital each bank should
provide according to its relative contribution to overall risk.
To compute Shapley values we have to deﬁne the characteristic function v(B) for a set
B  N of banks, which assigns a capital requirement to each possible combination of banks.6
4We calculate VaR i by adding the losses from all banks except bank i. Another way would be to remove bank
i from the banking system and then compute the loss distribution of the reduced system. We decided against the
latter approach, because removing a bank would leave holes in the remaining banks’ balance sheets when claims
on bank i do not equal liabilities to bank i as it is the case in our sample.
5While Shapley values were originally developed as a concept of cooperative game theory, they are also equi-
librium outcomes of noncooperative multi-party bargaining problems (see e.g. Gul (1989)).
6A potential caveat of this methodology is that all characteristic function games assume that the value v(B),
whichagroupofbanksB canachieve, isindependentofhowtheotherbanksthatarenotinB grouptogether. David
and Lehar (2009) analyze under what conditions banks ﬁnd it optimal to merge to avoid bankruptcy costs using a
7In our analysis we use two risk measures to deﬁne capital requirements: expected tail loss (EL)
and value-at-risk. To compute v(B) we add the proﬁts and losses for all the banks in B across
scenarios to get the joint loss distribution for B, i.e. lB;s =
P
i2B li;s. We assume a conﬁdence
level of 99.5% and then assign to v(B) either the corresponding VaR, which is the 5,000th
largest loss of lB, or the expected tail loss, i.e. the arithmetic average of the 5,000 biggest losses.
Deﬁne furthermore v(;) = 0, then the Shapley value for bank i, equal to its capital requirement,




jBj!(jNj   jBj   1)!
jNj!
(v(B [ i)   v(B)) (5)
Because the sum of the Shapley values will in general not add up to the total capital that is









One potential caveat of all systemic capital requirements is that capital allocations can be
negative, for example if a bank is negatively correlated with the other banks and therefore
reduces the risk of the system. This problem also applies to the Shapley value procedure.
Unless we assume monotonicity, i.e. v(S [ T)  v(S) + v(T), the core of the game can be
empty and negative Shapley values can be obtained. For our sample this problem did not occur
since bank correlations were sufﬁciently high.
2.4 CoVaR
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) we deﬁne CoVaR as the value-at-risk of an insti-
tution conditional of the fact that the whole banking system has realized a loss corresponding
to its VaR. However, since we have to compute the joint loss distribution by simulation, we
observe cases for which aggregate banking system losses exactly equal the VaR with measure
zero. We therefore deﬁne CoVaR as
bargaining game in partition form, which deﬁnes the value of a coalition conditional on the coalition structure of
the remaining banks. They ﬁnd that under certain conditions bargaining can break down and inefﬁcient liquidations
occur.
8Pr(li < CoVaRi j lp 2 [VaRp(1   );VaRp(1 + )]) = 0:5% (7)
Where we set  = 0:1.7 We then calculate
CoVaRi = CoVaRi   VaRi (8)










One benchmark that we use against systemic capital requirements is banks’ current capital lev-
els. These might differ from minimum capital requirements as banks want to hold reserves
against unexpected losses from risks that are not included in current regulation. Capital levels
might also differ due to lumpiness in capital issuance. Most banks have issued new capital be-
fore our sample period and individual banks could not have found adequate investment projects
for all the funds that they have raised and thus show excessive capital levels. To address the
latter problem, we create a second benchmark, for which we redistribute the existing capital
such that each bank has the same regulatory capital ratio, which is deﬁned as tier 1 capital over
risk weighted assets (RWA).8 We refer to this benchmark as the ”Basel equal” approach for the









We now turn to a description of the model used to generate the system loss distribution.
7We found that the capital requirements and the overall results are not signiﬁcatly different for  = 0:15 or
 = 0:05.
8Under current Basel capital requirements, banks have to assign a risk weight to each asset that ranges from
zero for government backed assets to one for commercial loans. The RWA are the sum of asset values multiplies
by their respective risk weight. The Basel accord requires at least 4% tier 1 capital, but countries are free to set
higher limits. Canada requires 7%.
93 A Model of the Banking System
We build upon the models developed in the recent literature on systemic risk in the ﬁnancial
system. We ﬁrst use a credit risk model to generate loan losses under a severe macroeconomic
recession (details are provided in Section 4). Following Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai,
Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009), we then integrate a network model of
extended exposures between banks, and an endogenous asset ﬁre sales (AFS) mechanism.9
To model the network of interbank obligations we extend the model of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) to include bankruptcy costs and uncertainty as done by Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006a). Consider a set N = f1;:::;Ng of banks. Each bank i 2 N has a claim on speciﬁc
assets Ai outside of the banking system, which we can interpret as the bank’s portfolio of non-
bank loans and securities. Each bank is partially funded by issuing senior debt or deposits Li
to outside investors. Bank i’s obligations against other banks j 2 N are characterized by the
nominal liabilities xij .
The total value of a bank is the value of its assets minus the outside liabilities Ai   Li plus
the value of all net payments to and from counterparties in the banking system. If the total
value of a given bank becomes negative, the bank is insolvent. In this case we assume that its
assets are reduced by a proportional bankruptcy cost . After outside debtholders are paid off,
any remaining value is distributed proportionally to creditor banks. We denote by d 2 RN
+ the
vector of total obligations of banks toward the rest of the system, i.e. di =
P
j2N xij: We deﬁne




di if di > 0
0 otherwise
(11)
When an institution is unable to meet its obligations, it may be forced to sell assets at prices
well below their fair value to achieve a quick sale. We integrate the impact of such AFS of a
distressed institution on both its own mark-to-market balance sheet and those of other institu-
tions holding the same class of assets. For this purpose, we extend the work done by Cifuentes,
9No government or central bank interventions to limit ﬁre sales of assets are allowed in the model. By doing so,
we better measure the externalities imposed by riskier banks on others. However, banks likely default much more
frequently in our model than they would in practice. Different international working groups are currently studying
ways to limit the occurrence of AFS in time of stress. Propositions include changes in margining practices, the use
of central clearing platforms, and higher minimum capital requirements.
10Shin, and Ferrucci (2005), in which banks were assumed equally risky, by differentiating banks
according to the riskiness of their assets. We assume that the equilibrium market price of the
illiquid assets of a bank is a decreasing function of their riskiness.
For each bank, the stock of outside assets, Ai, is divided into liquid and illiquid assets. Bank
i’s stock of liquid assets is given by ci and includes government’s securities and government
insured mortgages.10 Exposures between banks are also assumed liquid for simplicity. The
remainder of the bank’s assets, ei, are considered illiquid. The price of the illiquid asset of bank
i, pi, is determined in equilibrium, and the liquid asset has a constant price of 1. Thus the net
worth of bank i assuming all interbank claims get paid in full is
piei + ci +
N X
j=1
jidj   di   Li (12)
We model capital requirements in the spirit of the Basel II capital accord. Since all liquid
assets are backed by the government, they carry a zero risk-weight. Illiquid assets of bank i are
assumed to attract a risk-weight equal to the average risk-weight of the bank’s balance-sheet,
wi, and the average risk-weight of the banking sector assets is w.11 For the mark-to-market
value of the banks’ illiquid assets to reﬂect their riskiness, we assume that pi is a linear function
of the equilibrium average price p, and the deviation of the bank risk-weight from the banking
sector mean is
pi = min(1;p + (w   wi)) (13)
where  > 0 to ensure that assets sold by a riskier bank have lower mark-to-market value.12
We describe a banking system as a tuple (;E;C;L;d;P) for which we deﬁne a clearing
payment vector X. The clearing payment vector has to respect limited liability of banks and
proportional sharing in case of default. It denotes the total payments made by the banks under
10We include insured mortgages because they also carry a zero risk-weight under Basel II capital requirements
and, as will be explained further below, selling zero risk-weight assets does not improve regulatory capital require-
ments.
11A more realistic exercise would classify the bank’s assets in different risk class but this would increase con-
siderably the complexity of the model.
12This simple functional form is chosen for illustrative purpose. Before our model could realistically be used to
impose new regulatory requirements on banks, a sensitivity analysis of other functional forms would be necessary.
This is left for future work.























To ﬁnd a clearing payment vector, we employ a variant of the ﬁctitious default algorithm devel-
oped by Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Banks must satisfy a minimum capital ratio which stipulates that the ratio of the bank’s Tier
1 capital to the mark-to-market value of its assets must be above some prespeciﬁed minimum
r13 When a bank violates this constraint, we assume that it has to sell assets to reduce the size
of its balance-sheet.14 We denote by si the units of illiquid assets sold by bank i.15 Whereas
Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005) used a simple (non risk-weighted) leverage ratio, our con-
straint is closer in spirit to the Basel II accord in which banks have to hold capital commensurate
with the risk on their balance sheet. 16 Our minimum capital requirement is therefore given by
piei + ci +
P
j




The numerator is the equity value of the bank where the interbank claims and liabilities are
calculated in terms of the realized payments. The denominator is the marked-to-market risk-
weighted value of the bank’s assets after the sale of si units of the illiquid assets. The underlying
assumption is that assets are sold for cash and cash does not have a capital requirement. Thus
if the bank sells si units of the illiquid assets, the value of the numerator is unchanged since
this involves only a transformation of assets into cash, while the denominator is decreased since
cash has zero risk-weight. Thus, by selling some illiquid assets, the bank can reduce the size of
its balance-sheet and increase the capital asset ratio.17
13In the numerical exercise, the required minimum is set at 7%, as imposed by the Canadian regulator.
14We do not consider the possibility of raising fresh capital nor the need to sell assets because of a loss of
funding. The consequences of the latter would be similar to those described here, assuming the assets would have
to be sold at a discount.
15Selling liquid assets does not help to reduce the size of the balance-sheet because of their zero-risk weight.
Note however, that holding more liquid assets reduces the size of the balance-sheet ex-ante.
16In addition to the distinction between liquid and illiquid assets done in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005),
we differentiate banks according to the riskiness of their illiquid assets. Without doing so, riskier banks would
unrealistically ﬁnd it easier to reduce the size of their balance-sheets.
17A decrease in price should be seen as the average price decrease of all the illiquid assets on the balance-sheet,
some assets’ price potentially being unaffected while others suffering from huge mark-to-market losses.
12We make the assumption that banks cannot short-sell assets. Thus si 2 [0;ei]. An equi-
librium is the triple (X;S;P ) consisting of a vector of payments, vector of sales of illiquid
assets , and vector of prices p of the illiquid assets such that:
 For all banks i 2 N, x
i is determined according to equation (14).
 For all banks i, s
i is the smallest sale that ensures that the capital adequacy condition is
satisﬁed. If there is no value of si 2 [0;ei] for which the capital condition is satisﬁed then
s
i = ei.





The ﬁrst condition reiterates the limited liability of equity holders, and the priority of debt
holders over interbank liabilities.18 The second condition says that either the bank is liquidated
altogether, or its sales of illiquid assets reduces its assets sufﬁciently to comply with the capital
adequacy ratio. Finally, the third condition stipulates that the price of the illiquid assets is
determined by the intersection of a downward-sloping demand curve and the aggregate supply
curve.







where is  a positive constant.
By rearranging the capital condition in Equation (15), we can write the asset ﬁre sale si as a






(1   rwi)piei + ci +
P
j






Since each si(p) is decreasing in p, the aggregate sale function is decreasing in p. The lower
the price, the lower the mark-to-market value of banks’ assets, and the bigger the need to sell
18In reality, the legal situation might be more complicated and the seniority structure might differ from the
simple procedure we employ here.
13assets to bring capital ratios in line with the required regulatory minimum. The price adjustment
process is illustrated in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005).19









 + (w   wi))
!
(18)
From the solution of the clearing problem, we can gain additional economically important
information with respect to systemic stability. A bank is in default whenever it cannot meet its
interbank obligations, (x
i < di). We refer to the default of bank i as fundamental if bank i is
not able to honour its promises under the assumptions that all other banks honor their promises
and that prices are not affected by AFS (p = 1)
ei + ci +
N X
j=1
jidj   Li < di (19)
WedeﬁneabanktodefaultbecauseofAFS,wheneverthebankisnotinfundamentaldefault
but cannot honour its interbank obligations at the equilibrium price of the illiquid assets, even
when all other banks meet their interbank obligations. An AFS default occurs when
ei + ci +
N X
j=1
jidj   Li > di and
p

iei + ci +
N X
j=1
jidj   Li < di (20)
A contagious default occurs, when bank i defaults only because other banks are not able to
19The demand curve (parameter ) and the asset price function (parameter ) need to be calibrated such that an
equilibrium price exists for all potential positive levels of aggregate supply. Special care must be taken to make
sure that all individual asset prices are always between an exogenously ﬁxed downward limit above zero,pmin, and
1, the price when there is zero aggregate asset supply.
14keep their promises, i.e.,
p

iei + ci +
N X
j=1
jidj   Li > di but
p






j   Li < di (21)
To use the model for risk analysis, we model shocks to banks’ asset values by introducing a
distribution of banks’ credit losses as described in Section 4. As there is no closed form solution
for the distribution of the clearing vector X, we have to resort to a simulation approach where
each draw from the credit loss distributions, which we refer to as a scenario, maps into new asset
values for each bank. We solve the clearing problem for each scenario numerically. Thus from
an ex-ante perspective we can assess expected default frequencies, and decompose insolvencies
across scenarios into fundamental, AFS, and contagious defaults.
Our network model is able to capture two properties that we believe are important in mod-
eling systemic risk: spillover effects and feedback loops. When a bank gets in distress it sells
assets or defaults on its interbank claims, causing externalities for other banks. An increase in a
bank’s PD will therefore make asset ﬁre sales and default in the inter-bank market more likely,
and therefore increase the PDs of the other banks in the system. This spillover effect makes
the correlation of bank asset values dependent of the health of the overall system. When all
banks are well capitalized, asset ﬁre sales and interbank defaults are unlikely and correlation of
banks asset portfolios is driven by the correlation in the outside assets, i.e. the loan portfolios,
alone. In an asset ﬁre sale or contagion scenario, all asset values fall, exhibiting a correlation
close to one. As the capitalization of the whole banking system decreases, the probability of
realizing the asset ﬁre sale or contagion scenario increases and thus the ex-ante asset and default
correlation.
The feedback effect is driven by the asset ﬁre sale externalities and is described in detail
in Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005). When a bank start selling assets, prices drop, which
causes other banks to violate their capital requirements and forces them to sell assets as well,
causing all banks’ asset values to drop even further. This feedback effect accelerates bank
defaults as bank capitalization decreases.
To illustrate these two effects we compare our model to a Merton model. Figure 1 shows the
15Figure 1. Sensitivity of bank PDs with respect to changes in bank capital: The solid and dashed lines
show bank three’s probability of default (PD) for different levels of tier 1 capital in the Macro-stress
scenario under the network model and the Merton Model, respectively. The Merton model is calibrated
to match the PD of the network model for bank three’s observed level of tier 1 capital. The dotted line
shows how bank two’s PD changes with changes in bank three’s capital under the network model.
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PDs of banks 2 and 3 for different levels of bank three’s capitalization while leaving the other
banks’ capital levels unchanged. The solid line represents the PD for bank 3 under the network
model. As a benchmark we calibrate, given the bank’s current level of capital, the market value
of its assets as well as its volatility such that the one year PD and its ﬁrst derivative of the
Merton model match the PD and its derivative of the network model.20 The resulting PD from
the Merton model (dashed line) is below the PD from the network model. The sharp increase in
the PD of the network model is driven by the feedback effect.
The dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates the spillover effect by depicting bank 2’s PD as a
function of bank 3’s capital. In a Merton framework correlations in bank defaults can only be
20Given that we compute all values under a macro stress test scenario, we cannot use stock market data to
calibrate the Merton model. Let V be the market value of the bank’s assets, X the face value of its outside as well
as interbank liabilities,  the asset volatility, and  the growth rate of the bank assets which we assume to be 5%.
We set the time horizon to one year and deﬁne bank capital as E = V  X, compute the PD as PD = N(d2) with
d2 = (ln(V=X)+ 2=2)=. We know all variables except V and  which we get by matching the PD as well
as the derivative @PD=@E to the values from the network model. The graphs look similar for the other banks and
the results are robust with respect to different asset value growth rates .
16driven by asset correlations but changing one bank’s capitalization has no effect on other banks’
PDs. Asset ﬁre sales and contagion externalities cause an increase in bank 2’s PD as bank 3
reduces its capital.
4 Data and credit loss distributions
4.1 Simulation of credit losses
For the modeling of credit losses, we combine simulation results of two models: a Bank of
Canada internal model, and an extended CreditRisk+ model.
The ﬁrst model generates sectoral default rates that capture systematic factors affecting all
banks’ loans simultaneously. It relates the default rates of bank loans in different sectors to the
overall performance of the economy as captured by a selected set of macroeconomic variables.
The speciﬁcation adopted for the model allows for non-linearities. Historical proxies for sec-
toral default rates were constructed based on sectoral bankruptcy rates.21 The included macroe-
conomic variables are GDP growth, unemployment rate, interest rate (medium-term business
loan rate), and the credit/GDP ratio. We simulate sectoral distributions of 10,000 default rates
for 2009Q2 under a severe recession macro scenario.22 The sectoral distributions of default
rates are centered on ﬁtted values from sectoral regressions, and are generated using the corre-
lation structure of historical default rates.23 Descriptive statistics of these distributions as well
as historic peaks over the 1988-2006 period are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the sever-
ity of the macro scenario, mean default rates are much higher than historic peaks. Default rates
in the tail of the distributions are still higher.24
21The sectoral classiﬁcation used in constructing the default rates is the one used by banks in reporting their
balance sheet loan exposures. The seven sectors included were accommodation, agriculture, construction, man-
ufacturing, retail, wholesale, and mortgages in the household sector. For more details on the construction of
historical default rates, see Misina and Tessier (2007).
22We use the macroeconomic scenario that was designed for the macro stress-testing exercise conducted as a
part of Canada’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) update in 2007. With a recession that is about
one-third larger than experienced in the early 1990s, the stress-test scenario is plausible but extreme. See Lalonde,
Misina, Muir, St-Amant, and Tessier (2008) for a detailed description of the scenario.
23More speciﬁcally, for each sector, the mean of the distribution is the expected default rate under the scenario,
while the dispersion is obtained by adding random draws from the variance/covariance matrix of the historical
sectoral default rates. See Misina, Tessier, and Dey (2006) for more details on the simulation of default rates.
24A key component in modeling credit losses is banks’ sectoral Exposure-at default (EAD). Since the sectoral
17Table 1. Summary statistics of simulated default rate distributions for 2009Q2. Columns two to four
show the minimum, maximum and average default rates generated for each sector. Column ﬁve gives the
historic peak over the 1988-2006 period.
Minimum Average Maximum Historic Peaks
Accommodation 3:0 11:7 21:0 7:6
Agriculture 1:0 1:7 2:0 0:8
Construction 2:0 6:4 10:0 3:3
Manufacturing 5:0 12:2 20:0 8:3
Retail 0:0 4:3 8:0 5:3
Wholesale 2:0 7:0 12:0 4:6
Mortgage 0:0 0:6 1:0 0:6
A bank’s expected loss will not depend only on the default rate but also on the structure of
its loan portfolio. For a given default rate, a portfolio with a higher number of large exposures
will experience higher expected losses. In order to capture idiosyncratic risk factors arising
from the size distribution of banks’ exposures, we use an extended CreditRisk+ model as in
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a).25 A key input in this model is banks’ loan portfolios
compositions by sector, which are estimated using the Bank of Canada Banking and Financial
Statistics, and private data on banks’ largest exposures towards non-banks obtained from the
Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). For each bank, we draw 100
independentloansizeforeachofthe10;000sectoraldefaultratessimulatedpreviously, yielding
a total of 1;000;000 sectoral loan loss scenarios. The individual distributions of total expected
losses are derived by adding expected sectoral loan losses. Other key inputs include: the Loss-
given-default (LGD) assumed to be 50 percent26 and the sectoral Exposure-at-default (EAD) as
classiﬁcation used for reporting EADs by banks under Basel II is more aggregated than the one used in constructing










where k represents the number of balance sheet sub-sectors that can be subsumed in one of the Basel II sectors,
PDi represents our model’s default rates of sector i, and BSEi the corresponding balance sheet exposure.
25A recent overview on different standard approaches to model credit risk is Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000).
CreditRisk+ is a trademark of Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP). It is described in detail in Credit Suisse
(1997).
26There is little information on loss-given-default in Canada. Based on available information from the Ofﬁce
of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Misina, Tessier, and Dey (2006) estimated an average loss-given-bankruptcy
18reported by banks.27
Table 2 shows the importance of considering both sources of uncertainty. When considering
systematic factors only, expected losses to the 6 big banks average $45.7 Billion or 47.7 percent
of total Tier 1 Capital, with a standard deviation of $7.9 Billion. Taking both systematic and
idiosyncraticfactorsintoaccount, theexpectedlossesareapproximatelythesame($46.4Billion
on average), and, not surprisingly, are larger in the tail of the distribution (the 99 percent Value-
at-Risk (VaR) is $68.7 Billion as compared to $63.7 Billion in the ﬁrst distribution). As a
consequence, the frequency of bank defaults varies from zero when only systematic factors are
considered, to 0.06 percent on average (ranging between 0 and 0.19 percent) with both sources
of uncertainty.
Table 2. Aggregate losses and probabilities of default conditional on extreme stress scenario. Panel A
provides descriptive statistics of aggregate losses considering systematic factors only (Column 1) and
both systematic and idiosyncratic factors (Column 2). Panel 2 gives frequencies of bank defaults.
Systematic Systematic and idiosyncratic
factors factors
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of aggregate loss distributions
$Billion %of Tier1 capital $Billion %of Tier1capital
Mean  45:7 47:7  46:4 48:5
Standard Deviation 7:9 8:38 9:5 9:9
Quantiles:
99%  27:3 28:5  25:7 26:9
10%  55:8 58:4  58:8 61:4
1%  63:7 66:6  68:7 71:8




over the 1988-2006 period of 65 per cent. This overstates losses in case of default because bankruptcy is the last
stage of distress, and includes more than losses related to missed interest payments.
27Under Basel II, banks are required to provide an estimate of the credit exposure of a facility, should that facility
go into default at the risk horizon (typically one year).
194.2 Data on exposures between major Canadian banks
As in previous studies of systemic risk in foreign banking systems (see among others Sheldon
and Maurer (1998), Wells (2002) and Upper and Worms (2004)), our data cover exposures
between banks that arise from traditional lending (unsecured loans and deposits). We improve
on previous literature by expanding this set of exposures. We also cover another on-balance
sheet item, cross-shareholdings, and off-balance sheet instruments such as exchange traded and
OTC derivatives. While derivatives are often blamed for creating systemic risk, the lack of data
in many countries (including the U.S.) makes it hard to verify. Our expanded dataset enables
us to better capture linkages among banks and contagious bank defaults.28 Of course, other
types of exposures between banks exist - most notably those coming from intraday payment
and settlement, from bank holdings of preferred banks’ shares (and other forms of capital),
and from holdings of debt instruments issued by banks like debentures and subordinated debt.
Owing to data limitations, however, the latter are not considered in this work.
Data on the exposures are collected on a consolidated basis and come from different sources
as described below. Available data are collected for May 2008 with the exception of exposures
related to derivatives which are recorded as of April 2008. We present descriptive statistics in
Table 3.29
Data on deposits and unsecured loans come from the banks’ monthly balance-sheet reports
to OSFI. These monthly reports reﬂect the aggregate asset and liability exposures of a bank for
deposits, and only aggregate asset exposures for unsecured loans. Data on exposures related to
derivatives come from a survey initiated by OSFI at the end of 2007. In that survey, banks are
asked to report their 100 largest mark-to-market counterparty exposures that were larger than
$25 million. These exposures were related to both OTC and exchange traded derivatives. They
are reported after netting and before collateral and guarantees.30
The reported data are used to construct a matrix of Big 6 banks’ bilateral exposures. Data
28Zero-risk exposures, mainly repo style transactions, were excluded despite their large size. They accounted
for more than 80 per cent of total exposures between the Big Six Canadian banks in 2008Q2. These exposures
may represent a contagion channel in time of liquidity crisis, but this is left for future work.
29As it is standard in the network literature, we assume that there are two dates: the observation date and the
clearing date when all interbank claims are settled. In this paper, we set 2009Q2 as the clearing date since our
default rates are simulated for a one-year horizon.
30The derivatives exposures reported may be biased upward, since they were reported before collateral and
guarantees. In particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that the major Canadian banks often rely on high-quality
collateral to mitigate their exposures to OTC derivatives.
20on cross-shareholdings exposures were collected from Bank of Canada’s quarterly securities
returns.31
The aggregate size of interbank exposures was approximately $21.6 billion for the Six ma-
jor Canadian banks. As summarized in Table 3, total exposures between banks accounted for
around 25 per cent of bank capital on average. The available data suggest that exposures re-
lated to traditional lending (deposits and unsecured loans) were the largest ones compared with
mark-to-market derivatives and cross-shareholdings exposures. Indeed, in May 2008, exposures
related to traditional lending represented around $12.7 billion on aggregate, and 16.3 percent of
banks’ Tier 1 capital on average. Together, mark-to-market derivatives and cross-shareholdings
represented 10 per cent of banks’ Tier 1 capital on average.
A complete description of linkages between Canadian banks requires a complete matrix
of the bilateral exposures. Such a complete matrix was available only for exposures related
to derivatives. Unavailable bilateral exposures were estimated under the assumption that banks
spread their lending and borrowing as widely as possible across all other banks using an entropy
maximization algorithm (see e.g. Blien and Graef (1997)). A difﬁculty with this solution is that
it assumes that all lending and borrowing activities between banks are completely diversiﬁed.
This rules out the possibility of relationship banking i.e. a bank preferring some counterparties
to others (as reﬂected in the structure of banks’ exposures related to derivatives). As a bench-
mark, banks’ bilateral exposures were also estimated under the assumption that concentrations
of exposures between banks are broadly consistent with their asset sizes. As shown in Table
3, banks’ bilateral exposures are comparable under these two assumptions. Indeed, they are
consistent with the concentration of bilateral exposures related to derivatives.
5 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst present the results from simulations considering the two contagion chan-
nels described above. Credit losses were generated using systematic and idiosyncratic factors.
31These returns provide for each bank aggregate holdings of all domestic ﬁnancial institutions’ shares. Due to
data limitations, cross-shareholdings among the Big Six banks were estimated by (i) distributing the aggregate
holdings of a given bank according to the ratio of its assets to total assets of domestic ﬁnancial institutions, and (ii)
excluding shares that were held for trading (assuming that they are perfectly hedged).
21Table 3. Summary statistics on exposures between Canadian Banks. Panel A gives the aggregate size of
interbank exposures related to traditional lending, derivatives and cross-shareholdings (reported in $bil-
lion and as percentage of banks’ Tier 1 capital). Panel B gives banks’ bilateral exposures as percentage
of Tier 1 capital under two assumptions: entropy maximization and relationship banking.
Panel A: Aggregate exposures between Canadian banks
Agregate exposure As percentage of Tier1 capital
($Billion) Minimum Average Maximum
- Traditional lending 12.7 5.25 16.3 38.6
- Derivatives exposures 5.4 0.0 5.9 21.1
- Cross-shareholdings 3.5 0.3 4.1 8.8
- Total exposures 21.6 5.5 26.4 51.2
Panel B: Banks’ bilateral exposures as percentage of Tier 1 capital
Assumption: Minimum Average Maximum
- Entropy maximization 0.6 4.4 15.6
- Relationship banking 0.5 4.4 16.2
We then address the probability of a systemic crisis and move towards identifying systemic
banks. Finally, we compare the outcome of different mechanisms of capital allocation accord-
ing to individual contribution to systemic risk.
5.1 The impact of contagion channels
Table 4 reports the results obtained from simulations considering potential contagion from net-
work and asset ﬁre-sale effects for 1 million generated credit losses assuming that the minimum
price of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98, i.e. the stock of illiquid assets at each bank can at most
lose 2% in value, even when banks sell all their holdings.32 Two percent write-down of all Cana-
dian banks’ illiquid assets (deﬁned as all balance-sheet assets but cash, government securities
and insured mortgages) represent roughly $40 Billion, which is quite severe when compared
with about $22 Billion of trading book losses recorded by Canadian banks from the onset of
the current crisis to the third quarter of 2009. However, we think we could have observed such
huge losses in the absence of global policy responses. 33
32Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009) assume maximum
declines in asset values between 2% and 5%, depending on the asset class. Still, even a 2% drop in asset value is
quite severe given the high leverage of banks. For example, a bank with 5 units of capital, an average risk-weight
of 0.5 and 200 units of illiquid assets would see its capital ratio going from 5% to a little less than 1% after a 2%
marked-down of its illiquid assets.
33Note that $40 billion represents about a 15% write-down of Canadian banks’ trading book assets.
22Table 4. Bank defaults in the base scenario (Pmin = 0.98, N = 1 million): A bank is in fundamental
default, when it defaults given that all interbank claims are paid in full. Contagious defaults are recorded
when a bank defaults just because other banks do not honour their interbank commitments assuming
that no asset ﬁre sales occur. AFS PD refers to the probability of default stemming from write downs
due to asset ﬁre sales. Contagious PD (AFS) includes the defaults that arise because of contagion after
writedowns have been realized in banks’ balance sheets. Total PD (AFS) is the sum of columns 2,4, and
5.
Bank Fundamental PD Contagious PD AFS PD Contagious PD (AFS) Total PD (AFS)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1 0.00 0.00 2.96 3.47 6.43
2 0.15 0.00 9.09 0.94 10.19
3 0.00 0.00 2.99 6.33 9.31
4 0.01 0.00 6.50 3.93 10.45
5 0.00 0.00 1.61 6.09 7.69
6 0.19 0.01 4.53 6.93 11.65
A default is called fundamental when credit losses are sufﬁcient to wipe out all the capital of
the bank as deﬁned in Equation (19). Column three in Table 4 summarizes the PD from defaults
due to interbank contagion without asset ﬁre sales, i.e. when a bank has sufﬁcient capital to
absorb the credit losses in the non-bank sectors but is pushed to bankruptcy because of losses
on its exposures to other banks (as deﬁned in Equation (21) with p = 1). The third category of
default is the contagion due to asset ﬁre sales as deﬁned in Equation (20). In these cases a bank
has enough capital to withstand both the credit losses in the non-banking sector and the write-
down on other banks’ exposures but, conditional on the other losses having reduced capital, not
enough to withstand the mark-to-market losses due to its own asset ﬁre sale and/or the asset
ﬁre sale of the other banks. Asset ﬁre sales will also weaken the surviving banks and thus
make them more prone to contagion as reﬂected in column ﬁve (Contagious PD (AFS)), which
records the defaults deﬁned in Equation (21) with p < 1. Total PD is the sum of columns two,
four, and ﬁve and summarizes the total PD of a bank including the effect of asset ﬁre sales.34
The Canadian banking system is very stable without the consideration of asset ﬁre sales.
Both fundamental and contagious PDs are well below 20 basis points, even though we assume
increased loan losses due to an adverse macro scenario throughout the paper. In the asset ﬁre
34PDs do not reﬂect absolute losses from each source. For example, even though AFS PDs are much higher than
fundamental PDS, the average loss due to AFS is signiﬁcantly smaller than the average credit loss.
23sale scenario, troubled banks want to maintain regulatory capital requirements by selling off
assets, which causes externalities for all other banks as asset prices fall. PDs increase and as
banks get weaker because of writedowns they also become more susceptible for contagion. We
ﬁnd that banks 2, 4 and 6 have a higher risk of defaulting due to asset writedowns. While
banks 1, 3 and 5 are more likely to survive writedowns, losses to bank 3 and 5 weaken them
substantially so that they are more likely to default due to second round interbank contagion.
Overall, banks have PDs ranging from 6.43 to 11.65. Bank 1 and 5 stand out with the lowest
PDs while bank 6 has the highest one.
Remember that no government or central bank interventions to limit AFS are allowed in
the model to better measure the externalities imposed by more systemic banks on others. As a
result, thePDsofbanksarelikelymuchhigherinourmodelthaninamorerealisticworldwhere
central bank’s liquidity facilities and/or government measures would be put in place. Moreover,
these PDs are conditional on a very severe scenario. All things considered, the results shown in
Table 4 suggest that the Canadian banking system is very stable.
The number of bankruptcies jumps dramatically as market liquidity decreases. In columns
twotofouroftable5weallowassetpricestodrop50percentmorethaninthebasescenario. We
immediately see that ouranalysis is very sensitive to the minimum asset price, which deﬁnes our
demand function for the illiquid asset. Allowing ﬁre sale discounts of three percent increases
banks’ PDs signiﬁcantly All banks default almost in two out of three cases. Default correlation
is almost one (not shown), which explains why the total PDs are almost identical. While banks
2 and 4 are very likely to default because of writedowns in the value of their illiquid assets,
banks 3, 6 and especially bank 5 are more likely to be affected by contagion. Two possible
reasons could explain why these results are so sensitive to asset ﬁre sale discounts. First, high
Tier 1 capital requirements of 7%, compared to the 4% under Basel rules, trigger asset ﬁre sales
early, causing other banks to follow. Second the small number of banks causes each bank to
have a huge price impact when selling off illiquid securities, creating negative externalities for
the whole system.35
Two policy insights stand out from the latter results. First, in the last ﬁnancial crisis, regu-
lators were criticized for helping banks to ofﬂoad assets from their balance sheets at subsidized
prices, and for relaxing accounting rules on the basis that market prices did not reﬂect funda-
mental values, which allowed banks to avoid mark-to-market writedowns of their assets. While
35Besides the systemic aspect of the individual banks, the calibration of the demand curve is a key factor, and
requires judgment about the health and willingness to buy of other market players under the scenario.
24Table 5. severe asset ﬁre sales and partial interbank data, n = 1 million: AFS PD refers to the probability
of default stemming from writedowns due to asset ﬁre sales. Contagious PD (AFS) includes the defaults
that arise because of contagion after writedowns have been realized in banks’ balance sheets. Total PD
(AFS) is the sum of fundamental PD (from table 4, AFS PD, and contagious PD (AFS). Columns 2 to 4
show PDs when minimum price of the illiquid asset is reduced to Pmin = 0:97. Columns 5 to 7 repeat
the base scenario considering only exposures from interbank deposits.
Bank AFS PD Contagious PD (AFS) Total PD AFS PD Contagious PD (AFS) Total PD
(All data, Pmin=0.97, in %) (IB deposits only, Pmin=0.98, in %)
1 33.58 24.84 58.42 2.44 2.44 4.86
2 57.64 3.92 61.74 8.85 0.37 9.37
3 29.05 34.23 63.29 2.51 0.68 3.19
4 55.06 8.63 63.71 6.50 2.22 8.73
5 17.17 44.67 61.84 1.12 1.57 2.69
6 26.88 36.86 63.94 4.28 3.63 8.10
our analysis cannot show the long-term costs associated with these measures, we can at least
document that there is a signiﬁcant immediate beneﬁt for ﬁnancial stability by preventing asset
ﬁre sale induced writedowns. Second, a countercyclical reduction in the minimum Tier 1 capi-
tal requirements triggering asset ﬁre sales (or a higher capital buffer built in good time) would
reduce dramatically the risk of default triggered by AFS.
The right part of Table 5 presents the results when the matrix of exposures between banks
is restricted to interbank deposits. Since most of the previous literature analyzing exposures
between banks focuses on the interbank deposit market, these results serve as a good benchmark
of the models in previous papers. Without cross-shareholdings and derivatives exposures we
get substantially lower PDs for some banks as well as a very different ranking of banks’ PDs.
Given that most regulators around the world do not have access to data for derivatives exposure
between banks, our analysis shows that inaccurate data can lead to severe underestimation of
systemic risk by regulators’ offsite analysis models.
5.2 The probability of a ﬁnancial crisis
So far we examined the impact of contagion through linkages among banks and asset ﬁre sales
on the individual bank’s riskiness. In this section we want to address the probability of a sys-
25Table 6. Probability of multiple bank defaults: column two lists the probabilities that one to six banks
default simultaneously in the given macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a minimum price
of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98. Columns three to eight show for each row n the probability that a
particular bank defaults given that a total of n banks default.
Number Probability probability of involvement of bank
defaults (in %) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 3.53 4.64 30.86 6.97 15.49 0.75 41.28
2 1.16 9.07 47.48 20.70 49.03 3.44 70.29
3 0.84 14.60 57.19 45.28 83.50 12.40 87.03
4 1.11 22.21 69.86 81.68 95.25 34.96 96.04
5 2.66 32.17 88.55 97.95 99.15 82.69 99.48
6 4.94 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
temic crisis and move towards identifying systemically relevant banks.
Table 6 shows the probability that one to six banks default simultaneously in our severe
scenario. In almost 25% of the cases in which a default is observed, contagion is contained as
only one bank defaults (column 2). However, default correlation is relatively high as ﬁve or six
banks would default in more than ﬁfty percent of the cases. For each row n, Columns three to
eight show the PD of each bank conditional on the default of n banks. Bank 1 has a low default
correlation with other banks as it is less likely to default in scenarios of multiple defaults. In
contrast, banks three, four and six are almost always involved when three or more banks default.
Identifyingwhichbankscontributemosttotheprobabilityofasystemiccrisisisnotstraight-
forward. One approach is to see which banks are most often involved in multiple bank defaults.
Table 7 shows the likelihood that one to six banks will default conditional on the default of a
speciﬁc bank, i.e. row 2 column 6 shows the probability that exactly four banks default, con-
ditional on the default of bank 2. Again, mainly because of contagion due to AFS, we see that
banks’ defaults in the Canadian system are correlated as the default of any bank is associated
with the wipeout of at least four other banks with close to 80 percent probability on average
(line ﬁve). Based on this approach, banks 2 and 6 are less involved in a systemic crisis, as there
is more than a 10% chance that their default will be contained and not associated with a domino
effect. On the opposite, bank 5 is most likely to be involved in multiple defaults.
In the recent crisis there has been a lot of discussion on the topic of systemically relevant
26Table 7. Probability of multiple bank defaults conditional on a bank’s default: column two contains for
each bank one to six the PD in the given macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a minimum
price of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98. Columns three to eight show for each row n the probability of
one to six total defaults conditional on bank n’s default.
Bank PD Cond. probability of multiple defaults
(in %) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 6.43 2.55 1.64 1.91 3.82 13.28 76.80
2 10.19 10.70 5.41 4.72 7.60 23.08 48.50
3 9.31 2.64 2.58 4.09 9.71 27.93 53.05
4 10.45 5.24 5.45 6.72 10.10 25.21 47.30
5 7.69 0.35 0.52 1.35 5.03 28.54 64.21
6 11.65 12.51 7.00 6.28 9.13 22.68 42.41
Table 8. Individual bank default probability conditional on the default of a speciﬁc bank in the given
macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98:
Column 2 shows the PD for each bank. Columns 3 to 8 of row n show each bank’s PD conditional of
bank n’s default.
Bank PD Cond. Default Probability (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 6.43 - 87.57 92.99 94.72 83.59 95.20
2 10.19 55.30 - 78.31 83.02 69.32 86.51
3 9.31 64.23 85.66 - 94.06 78.97 93.94
4 10.45 58.33 80.97 83.86 - 72.33 91.00
5 7.69 69.88 91.78 95.59 98.19 - 98.09
6 11.65 52.56 75.64 75.09 81.59 64.78 -
banks. Similar to Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006b) we compute in Table 8 for each bank
the probability of default conditional on one other bank’s default. We can see again that the
Canadian banking system is interdependent. The default of any one bank is correlated with the
default of any other bank with a probability of more than 50%. Consistent with the results in
table 7, the defaults of banks one and ﬁve (two and six) are correlated the most (less) with other
banks default.36
36The results in this section are based on correlations and do not reﬂect causality.
27Table 9. Capital requirements for selected systemic capital allocation rules in percent of 2008Q2 tier 1
capital (in %): Capital requirements are computed such that they match the risk contributions under the
ﬁve risk allocation mechanisms. Loss distributions are computed for the macro stress scenario including
asset ﬁre sales and a minimum price of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98
Bank Component Incremental Shapley value CoVaR
VaR VaR Expected loss VaR
1 95.33 104.56 105.18 105.25 96.45
2 103.95 101.91 102.52 102.34 103.57
3 96.17 92.95 92.62 92.54 96.69
4 110.44 114.07 113.11 113.47 95.94
5 91.74 89.23 89.20 89.14 91.92
6 106.66 104.26 104.31 104.38 149.62
5.3 Systemic capital requirements
Systemic capital requirements attempt to internalize the externalities in the ﬁnancial system.
The results presented above show that network and asset ﬁre sales externalities are important
and should be taken into account in designing capital requirements policy. Table 9 shows the
results of the ﬁve capital allocation procedures presented in Section 2 in percent of actual ob-
served capital requirements. All allocation rules (except for the CoVaR in the case of Bank
4) suggest that Banks 2, 4 and 6 are undercapitalized, while banks 3, and 5 are overcapitalized,
from a systemic viewpoint. This is consistent with the results of Table 5 showing the relatively
higher (lower) default probabilities of undercapitalized (overcapitalized) banks. Bank 6 for
example should increase capital by as much as 50% according to the CoVaR methodology.
Results are less clear for Bank 1. While three procedures ﬁnd it to be undercapitalized, the
other two suggest the reverse. This is consistent with mixed indications on Bank 1’s systemic
importance as shown in Tables 6 to 8. Systemic capital requirements are not directly related
to individual bank PDs or size. The correlation of adjusted capital ratios and total assets are
between -0.77 and -0.02 with four out of ﬁve being close to zero . Our ﬁndings are not consis-
tent with the suggestion that larger banks necessarily pose a greater threat to systemic risk and
should be required to hold more capital. 37 Size is only one element contributing to the systemic
importance of a bank. Other factors include holdings of liquid assets and asset’s riskiness.
37This may be speciﬁc to Canada, given the relatively similar size of Canadian banks.
28Table 10. Individual bank default probability under selected macroprudential capital allocation rules
(in %). Default probabilities are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a
minimum price of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98.
Bank Observed Basel Component Incremental Shapley value CoVaR
capital equal VaR VaR Expected loss VaR
1 6.43 9.05 6.60 3.91 3.75 3.73 7.53
2 10.19 9.97 7.68 8.15 7.91 7.97 8.93
3 9.31 8.91 8.34 8.82 8.87 8.91 10.57
4 10.45 9.04 6.72 5.77 5.91 5.85 11.97
5 7.70 7.73 7.55 7.76 7.73 7.74 9.47
6 11.65 10.53 8.28 8.49 8.44 8.43 2.42
Average 9.29 9.21 7.53 7.15 7.10 7.11 8.48
Compared to the observed capital levels, all systemic capital allocations reduce the default
probability of the average bank. Table 10 shows the default probabilities of the six banks under
the observed capital ratio, the ”Basel equal” benchmark, as well as under the ﬁve macropru-
dential allocations. The Component VaR method creates relatively homogeneous PDs for all
banks, increasing the likelihood of default for bank 1, but making banks 2 to 6 less prone to
default. The incremental VaR and Shapley allocations leave bank 3 and 5’s PD relatively un-
changed but reduce the PD for banks 1 and 4 and 6 substantially. The CoVaR reduces Bank 6
PD dramatically.
All ﬁve systemic capital requirements reduce risk in the banking system. Table 11 presents
the probability of multiple bank defaults for the ﬁve capital allocation rules. Especially incre-
mental VaR and the Shapley value allocations reduce the probability of multiple bank failures
signiﬁcantly. Under Shapley value based capital allocations the probability of ﬁve or six banks
defaulting can be reduced from 7.6%, which is based on current banks’ capital levels, to 5.5%.
This corresponds to a 27% reduction in the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis.
Table 12 computes the expected loss under the different capital allocation mechanisms. The
expected loss equals the fair deposit insurance premium assuming that all bank liabilities are
insured. We can again see that systemic capital requirements can substantially reduce bank risk
compared to capital levels under the current regulatory regime.
29Table 11. Probability of multiple bank defaults under selected macroprudential capital allocation rules
(in %): The table shows the probabilities that one to six banks will default simultaneously. Default
probabilities are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a minimum price
of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98. Column two is identical to column two in Table 6.
Number Observed Basel Component Incremental Shapley value CoVaR
defaults capital equal VaR VaR Expected loss VaR
1 3.53 3.55 3.01 3.43 3.39 3.41 3.01
2 1.16 1.05 0.85 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.20
3 0.84 0.60 0.51 0.75 0.73 0.75 1.25
4 1.11 0.70 0.67 1.08 1.06 1.08 2.47
5 2.66 1.70 1.71 2.49 2.58 2.57 4.06
6 4.94 6.09 4.62 3.04 2.95 2.93 1.93
 5 7.60 7.78 6.33 5.53 5.53 5.50 5.98
 4 8.70 8.48 7.00 6.60 6.59 6.59 8.46
Table 12. Expected loss in percent of total assets under selected macroprudential capital allocation rules:
Expected loss is deﬁned as negative equity capital in the case of default and zero otherwise. Default
probabilities are computed for the macro stress scenario including asset ﬁre sales and a minimum price
of the illiquid asset Pmin = 0:98.
Number Observed Basel Component Incremental Shapley value CoVaR
defaults capital equal VaR VaR Expected loss VaR
1 0.55 0.84 0.59 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.71
2 0.96 0.94 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.85
3 0.93 0.89 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.91 1.08
4 0.99 0.84 0.61 0.52 0.53 0.53 1.15
5 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.95
6 1.18 1.06 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.20
Total 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20
306 Conclusions
One feature of the macroprudential approach is to threat aggregate risk in the ﬁnancial system
as being dependent on the collective actions of ﬁnancial institutions and markets. In this paper,
we use a model which explicitly considers contagion effects through network and asset ﬁre sale
externalities and sheds light on their importance. We generate an aggregate loss distribution of
the banking system using a balance-sheet stress-testing model that integrate credit and market
liquidity risk in a network of exposures between banks. To better capture the likelihood of
contagion default, we use a unique sample of the Canadian banking system, which includes
detailed information on interbank linkages including OTC derivatives.
We compare alternative mechanisms of allocating systemic risk to individual institutions.
Importantly, we follow an iterative procedure to solve for a ﬁxed point for which capital alloca-
tions are consistent with the contributions of each bank to the total risk of the banking system,
under the proposed capital allocations. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial stability can be enhanced substan-
tially by implementing a system perspective on bank regulation. The resulting new allocations
of capital reduce signiﬁcantly both the default probabilities of individual institutions and the
probability of multiple bank defaults.
We also ﬁnd that ignoring our information on derivatives and cross shareholdings gives us a
different picture of individual bank risk with potential important implications for systemic risk.
This speaks to the importance of getting better information about exposures between ﬁnancial
institutions
Our results are of course dependent on the calibration of the model used in this paper and
the severity of the underlying scenario, and reﬂect the features of the Canadian banking system.
However, we think the approach we propose could be useful, combined with expert judgment,
in guiding the implementation of a macroprudential approach to ﬁnancial system regulation.
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